Foreword: Punitive Damages Today and Tomorrow by Galligan, Thomas C., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 70 | Number 2
Symposium on Punitive Damages
Winter 2010
Foreword: Punitive Damages Today and
Tomorrow
Thomas C. Galligan Jr.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Foreword: Punitive Damages Today and Tomorrow, 70 La. L. Rev. (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol70/iss2/2
Foreword: Punitive Damages Today and Tomorrow
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.*
One of the great benefits of any symposium is the promise the
format provides to stimulate thought and dialogue. That promise
becomes reality when one begins with an important and
stimulating topic. Then, the style of the symposium paper comes
into play. A symposium piece is generally shorter than a traditional
law review article. As such, it gets to its point faster and more
directly. Its logic is manifest and stripped of the longer article's
tendency to painstakingly cover every detail at stake in the
material. The symposium piece is a short story or novella rather
than a novel. It is The Great Gatsby not Gone with the Wind. It
may persuade but its pithier presentation and style will often
provoke.
This Louisiana Law Review punitive damages symposium has
all the elements for success. The topic-punitive damages-is
critical and controversial. The authors are experts in their fields
who take advantage of the symposium format and style to
compellingly present their points in thoughtful pieces that will
further the national and international dialogue. As the person
introducing this symposium, I will seek to briefly do several things
herein. First, I will, perhaps unnecessarily, remind the reader just
why the topic is so important. Second, I will provide a brief
roadmap to each of the pieces. And third, in the spirit of symposia,
I will be provoked by the authors. For each of these excellent
pieces I will seek to provide readers with a brief comment or
question for consideration as they read.
So, why is the topic important? Over the last twenty years, much
has been written about punitive damages. Those damages-
sometimes called punitive, sometimes called exemplary, sometimes
called smart money-are awards above and beyond compensatory
damages that are designed to punish and deter the defendant and
others like him, her, or it. What are the moral, economic, and
historic justifications for punitive damages? Are they still applicable
today? Why is it ever appropriate for the civil law of torts to punish;
isn't that the purpose of the criminal law? Can juries be consistent in
awarding punitive damages? Can appellate judges be consistent
when they review punitive damages awards? How does one gauge
and compare the value of consistency with the value of flexibility in
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individual cases involving different facts? Is it moral for a plaintiff
to recover more than enough to make him or her whole? Is such an
increased recovery a windfall? Are punitive damages in civil cases
constitutional? Under what circumstances are they unconstitutional?
Whatever might be said about using the civil law to punish, are
damages in tort suits inadequate to deter from an economic
perspective? If so, might there be a role for some type of increased
or augmented damages, designed not to punish but to deter?' These
are just a few of the questions that courts and commentators have
considered regarding this controversial area of the law. And, it
seems, the more punitive damages cases that courts decide and the
more that commentators write about the subject the more there is to
be said. This well-conceived and extremely well presented
symposium is proof positive that the punitive damages field has
much ground that still needs tilling.
The issues presented here are many. Are there Constitutional
limits on punitive damages beyond those that the United States
Supreme Court has already imposed? What is the proper place for
the class action vehicle in punitive damages cases? After two
significant recent Supreme Court cases dealing with punitive
damages in maritime law, what does the future hold in that area
and what impact might those decisions have on admiralty law
beyond their holdings? What is and what should be the law
concerning vicarious liability for punitive damages? In a global
economy and legal environment, consideration of the civil law
world's consistent rejection of punitive damages is relevant and
may tell us much about the differences between the civil and
common law systems-but what? How does Louisiana law treat
punitive damages? Has Louisiana's choice to generally follow the
civil law trend of denying punitive damages, except where the
legislature has so provided, result in a more predictable system? A
more arbitrary system? A more coherent system? And, finally,
what are some of the forum shopping and conflicts of law issues
that punitive damages present? These are just a few of the topics
the articles in this symposium present.
1. This is an issue that has fascinated me and that I have addressed. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to Underdeterrence in
Torts, 70 Mo. L. REV. 691 (2005); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating
More-Than-Whole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and
Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REV. 117 (2003) [hereinafter Galligan, Deterrence and
Punishment]; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient
Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Galligan,
Augmented Awards].
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In his article, Punitive Damages and the Constitution,2 Thomas
Dupree, a partner with Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher LLP, reviews
the due process cases dealing with when the amount of punitive
damages awarded may be unconstitutional, and he contends that
the Constitution's guarantee of due process goes beyond limiting
the amount of a punitive award. Dupree argues that there should be
a constitutional limitation on when a court may award punitive
damages at all. He relies upon the void for vagueness doctrine as
well as what he terms a common law requirement that a person
cannot be punished for objectively reasonable conduct. Dupree
argues that objectively reasonable conduct might be defined to
include the following: compliance with a federal or state statute or
regulation in designing a product; compliance with custom or
industry standards; or the existence of a real doubt within the
relevant community about the propriety of the conduct involved.
As the reader considers Dupree's article she may ask herself
whether liability for pain and suffering or mental distress damages
would also be susceptible to constitutional attack under Dupree's
arguments about notice and vagueness. 3 That is, is the award of
damages in an amount necessary to compensate an individual
plaintiff predictable? Or certain? Of course such an award is
designed to compensate not to punish, but the notice and
consistency issues seem just as salient with many types of general
damages tort law awards. As for Dupree's proposal regarding a
constitutional defense based on complying with objectively
reasonable conduct, one may wonder how an objectively
reasonable actor is ever subject to liability unless that liability is
strict liability. And if the liability is strict and not otherwise based
on fault-whether intent, recklessness, or negligence--one would
have to search long and hard for a jurisdiction that imposes
liability for punitive damages based on purely strict liability.
However the reader answers these questions, Dupree's article
raises considerable questions about punitive damages under the
Constitution and provides fodder for further due process challenges
to the common law of punitive damages. It is must reading for
defense lawyers representing parties in potential punitive damages
cases.
Francis McGovern, a law professor at Duke Law School and
one of the nation's foremost experts on class actions, tackles the
knotty issue of punitive damages and class actions in the aptly
2. 70 LA. L. REv421 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1093 (2005).
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titled, Punitive Damages and Class Actions.4 Noting that most
courts have been hostile to the class action device in punitive
damages cases, he proceeds to consider the factors underlying the
Supreme Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence.
McGovern concludes that a class action for punitive damages ma
be desirable in a case like Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Baker),
where all persons are asserting the same cause of action (i.e., the
same legal theory of recovery); the parties have a real and similar
relationship; the goal of the class action is to prevent
overdeterrence; the defendant is the moving party, the
compensatory damages are determined and are economic; the
scope of the harm occurred within a single state; all parties are
included; the conduct involved was reprehensible; and the class
action is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B) case. He
also notes that the practical desire to resolve claims in one action
may be compelling.
McGovern then turns away from the punishment rationale for
punitive damages to an economic rationale-avoiding
underdeterrence. That rationale provides that by awarding
augmented or increased (I shy away from the word "punitive" here
because the purpose of such damages would not be punishment,
but deterrence) damages in litigated cases, the court may
encourage defendants to take account of all the costs of their
activities. Here, McGovern notes the existence of devices available
to courts and litigators to assess total damages as societal costs and
points out the possibility that there may be ways to also
appropriately and fairly distribute the damages among plaintiffs in
such a case. One notes that McGovern's notions would fit well in
several types of cases; one paradigm case might be where many
people suffer some small loss but a loss that is not adequate (in
size) to induce any of them to go to the trouble of filing and
prosecuting a law suit. Of course, if a class included everyone
affected then one might analytically ask whether the award would
be augmented or be merely an award of compensatory damages to
all concerned. At the end of the day, the reader may ask whether
total societal damages to McGovern are different from total
available tort damages. If they are not, then the class action is the
vehicle that aggregates all claimants, and the award is neither
punitive nor augmented; it is compensatory. If societal harm is
somehow additional to total tort liability as society currently
conceives it, then some further discussion of why those damages
4. 70 LA. L. REv. 435 (2010).
5. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
6. See supra note 3.
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should be awarded and recovered seems essential. That said, I
share McGovern's optimism and hope that the class action vehicle
might be a most appropriate procedural vehicle in certain types of
punitive damages cases.
In Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and
Townsend,8 David Robertson, the W. Page Keeton Chair in Tort
Law and University Distinguished Teaching Professor at the
University of Texas at Austin, does his characteristically thorough,
well-reasoned, clear, and persuasive work in explaining and
analyzing recent Supreme Court maritime punitive damages
jurisprudence and its relationship to previous decisions. In
particular, he discusses Baker9 (in the interests of full disclosure I
was a signatory of an amicus brief in the case urging the Court to
respect the punitive damages awarded in the lower court)10 and
Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend (Townsend)." He aptly points
out that both cases expressly recognize the availability of punitive
damages in maritime tort cases. Critically, Robertson also analyzes
the impact of Baker and Townsend on Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp.' In Miles, the Supreme Court refused to allow a surviving
parent to recover loss of society damages for the death of a seaman
caused by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel (a bellicose
seaman who killed the decedent by repeatedly knifing him) on
which the seaman-son served.13 Some interpreted Miles beyond its
holding and contended that it provided a limitation on recovery of
various types of nonpecuniary damages in maritime cases,
including punitive damages. Robertson calls this a "revisionist"
reading of Miles and attacks it. Notably, he ably points out that
Baker and Townsend also seem to reject it. In typical Robertson
fashion, he raises questions left unanswered after Townsend (the
later of the two cases). Are punitive damages available in Jones
Act cases? Given his historical reading of Federal Employers
Liability Act cases, one might conclude Robertson's answer is:
they should be. Are punitive damages in cases involving the
7. For how that discussion might proceed, see, e.g., Galligan, Deterrence
and Punishment, supra note 1, at 128-46; Galligan, Augmented Awards, supra
note 1, at 40-58.
8. 70 LA. L. REv. 463 (2010).
9. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605.
10. Brief for Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and Economics Scholars
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219).
11. 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009).
12. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
13. The Supreme Court also held that survival action damages for lost
earning capacity in a Jones Act case were not available for the period the
decedent would have lived but for the tortious act that caused death.
2010]
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arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure subject to
Baker's one-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
cap? Given the conditional language the Court used in Baker about
conduct that was not profitable in itself, Exxon's lack of
exceptional blameworthiness, and the fact that the compensatory
damages in Baker were significant, one may conclude that there
are strong arguments the one-to-one cap may not apply in some
failure to pay maintenance and cure cases. In what other maritime
cases might punitive damages be available? And, are attorneys'
fees (perhaps in addition to punitive damages) still available for the
arbitrary failure to pay maintenance and cure? Robertson clearly
says yes.
The reader might also note one point that Robertson does not
explicitly make, as it is really tangential to his main themes. Since
its decision, as Robertson notes, Miles has been the subject of
much litigation over its reach, scope, and implications. Those
hoping to limit it might argue that Miles should be limited to its
holding and should not be extended. Those hoping to extend it-
and they have been quite successful-might argue that Miles
expresses a uniformity principle that limits recovery of
nonpecuniary damages in maritime cases. Clearly, Townsend
rejects this uniformity principle insofar as it would disallow
recovery of punitive damages in cases involving the arbitrary and
willful failure to pay maintenance and cure. However, it is worth
noting that Townsend is not the first case in which the Supreme
Court considered the reach of Miles. In Yamaha Motor Corp., Inc.
v. Calhoun,14 the Court considered whether the family of a non-
seafarer killed in territorial waters could recover loss of society
damages under state law and held that they could. In so holding,
the Court refused to extend Miles. Thus, Robertson's reader might
consider that the Supreme Court has twice considered whether to
extend Miles beyond its holding and has refused to do so both
times. This fact should prove particularly advantageous to those
who contend that Miles should not be extended beyond its holding
and who contend that courts that extended Miles have misread the
Supreme Court's Miles tea leaves.
In Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages,15 Professor
Michael Sturley, the Stanley D. and Sandra J. Rosenberg
Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin,
considers when a principal may be held liable for punitive damages
arising out of an agent's tort. Sturley relies particularly on
admiralty cases but applies his analysis more broadly. He notes
14. 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
15. 70 LA. L. REv. 501 (2010).
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that there are three possibilities for imposing vicarious liability: 1)
when the principal has directed, been complicit in, or participated
in the wrongful conduct; 2) when the agent is a managerial
employee who is acting in the course and scope of employment;
16
or 3) whenever the agent is an employee who is acting in the
course and scope of employment. Sturley argues for the first
option, particularly in the maritime context. He contends that it is
the better rule based on precedent and policy. His starting point is
that punitive damages are punishment and therefore must be
properly contained and constrained-what he calls a classic liberal
argument. Moreover he contends that the history and tradition of
the maritime industry counsel the complicity standard because
there is a tradition that shipowners are not liable (often even for
compensatory damages) for the misconduct of ships' captains and
crews when away from the home port. 17 Limiting liability for
punitive damages in a particularly dangerous business will foster
investment in a large and important industry consistent with other
maritime limitations of liability; and maritime commerce is by
nature peripatetic. This last fact poses a significant need to create a
uniform body of international law, and many jurisdictions do not
recognize the right to recover punitive damages. Sturley then notes
arguments in favor of more expanded vicarious liability but does
not find them persuasive. He goes on to predict how the Supreme
Court might decide the maritime vicarious liability for punitive
damages issue, identifying Justice Alito as a key vote and positing
that Justice Alito is no fan of punitive damages. Finally Sturley
ponders the extent to which any new Supreme Court admiralty
decision on the reach of vicarious liability for punitive damages
might influence the development of the common law.
Sturley's excellent article brings a few thoughts to mind. First,
one notes that corporations cannot act except through their agents;
so how does a corporation ever direct or participate in conduct
except through its agents? To treat some agents in this context
differently from others (for purposes of finding the organization
complicit through the act of some high-ranking agent) requires an
answer to the question why or on what doctrinal basis--other than
16. As Sturley notes, this option is based on Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 909 (1977) and Restatement (Second) ofAgency § 217 (1957). The managerial
employee basis for vicarious liability is actually one of four that the
Restatements provide.
17. Sturley here relies on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (previously
codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (2000)) and the Harter Act (46 U.S.C.
§§ 30701-30707 (2006)). The Limitation of Liability Act also lends credence to
his argument since a shipowner who is not in privity or does not have
knowledge may limit its liability to the value of the vessel.
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a desire to limit liability? As noted, Sturley makes a spirited
argument for limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages in
admiralty, and he may well be right when he suggests that the
Supreme Court might adopt his reasons, given the current make-up
of the Court. But what impact should that have on the broader
common law? Many of his claims for limited liability are based on
particular maritime law concerns; thus one might justifiably ask
whether a decision to limit liability based on those arguments
should be persuasive outside the field of maritime law.
Professor Michael Wells, a Professor at the University of
Georgia School of Law, in A Common Lawyer's Perspective on the
European Perspective on Punitive Damages,1 8 undertakes to
answer the question: why did the common law adopt and accept
punitive damages while the modem civil law did not? Wells' work
conclusively proves the truth of one of his underlying premises-a
comparative analysis of any legal problem is insightful, valuable,
and expands one's perspective. In many ways, Wells' piece in this
symposium in this wonderful law review underscores the
incredible benefits of studying, working, and publishing at a law
school like Louisiana State University and in a jurisdiction like
Louisiana-a civil law jurisdiction in a common law nation (albeit
this latter may today be a characterization). The opportunity for
comparative analysis is rich. Wells hypothesizes that the fact that
common law jurisdictions have embraced punitive damages and
civil law jurisdictions have eschewed them is not the result of
different cost-benefit analyses concerning the social value of
exemplary damages, but rather reveals something deeper. He
opines that the civil law may lend itself to a more conceptual,
coherent approach to legal analysis in which law is derived from
some higher source than the judge-legislature, code, etc.-and
that in such a system the deontological distinction between the
private law and the public law may be more rigidly preserved than
it is at common law. The common law, alternatively, has
developed by focusing on the judge deciding an individual case
and then finding and applying the governing principle afterward.
Wells notes that common law courts may be more responsive to
policy arguments in the context of deciding individual cases than
civil law judges who seek and apply overarching principles derived
from the governing law. Focusing on these systemic
developmental differences, Wells then considers how the doctrine
of punitive damages developed in the common law and finds that
development consistent with his overarching model. The piece is
informative and insightful on many levels. Interestingly, today
18. 70 LA. L. REv. 557 (2010).
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those who attack punitive damages do so based on some of the
reasons why the civil law has, for the most part, rejected them-
punishment is not appropriate in civil cases; punitive damages lack
coherence; and punitive damages awards lack true consistency. As
one considers Wells' fine work, one may ask why, if the common
law develops jurisdiction by jurisdiction and case by case, do most
common law jurisdictions (if not all) allow punitive damages?
Why do more not reject punitive damages? If it is because the
common law, "in general," has adopted punitive damages then
does that "brooding omnipresence" 19 of the common law impact
particular common law decision-makers and judges much the same
as the applicable civil code influences the decisions of civil law
judges?
John deGravelles, a leading Louisiana practitioner, discusses
the Louisiana law of punitive damages in his insightful article,
Louisiana Punitive Damages-A Conflict of Traditions.20 He
thoroughly reviews the history of punitive damages in the civil and
common law and then turns to Louisiana in particular. He points
out that early in Louisiana's history punitive damages were
recoverable as "smart money" but that since 1917 Louisiana courts
have refused recovery of punitive damages unless authorized by
statute. The article then reviews the current state of the law
involving punitive damages in Louisiana under applicable statutes.
Appropriately, the majority of the article is spent on Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.4, which authorizes the recovery of
punitive damages for cases involving injury caused by the wanton
and reckless disregard of the rights of others by a defendant whose
intoxication while operating a motor vehicle is a cause in fact of
the plaintiff's injuries. It then turns to cases arising under Civil
Code article 2315.7-punitive damages caused by criminal sexual
activity occurring during childhood; Louisiana Revised Statute
15:1312-punitive damages for the interception, disclosure, or use
of wire or oral communication; and Louisiana Revised Statute
9:2800.76-punitive damages for the sale, distribution, or
marketing of an illegal controlled substance. One question
implicitly raised is whether it would be appropriate for Louisiana
to reexamine its historical (since 1917) reluctance to impose
punitive damages as other civil law jurisdictions increase the
availability of punitive damages. One also may ask whether the
Louisiana approach is more coherent than the common law.
Certainly, there is logic to following the legislature's lead but
turning from the courts to the legislature, but are the categories in
19. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
20. 70 LA. L. REv. 579 (2010).
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which punitive damages are available in Louisiana linked by any
overarching, rational principle? Are there no other cases to which
that principle, if it exists, applies? Or, is Louisiana left with a
potpourri of punitive damages statutes connected only by the fact
that all are legislatively created and require some conduct beyond
mere negligence?
Patrick Borchers, a professor, university vice president for
academic affairs, and the former dean at Creighton School of Law
thoroughly discusses and analyzes a wide array of conflicts of law
punitive damages issues in Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping,
and the Conflict of Laws.2 1 He considers jurisdiction, venue, forum
shopping, enforcement of judgments, and choice of law. After
considering the issues raised and their complexity, one wonders
whether, as may be true with many conflicts issues, serious
litigation of conflicts issues is prone to take place only (or at least
more often) when the stakes are high. One may also be curious
how the same issues might impact the pretrial procedure and
possible settlement of a multi-district litigation case in which many
underlying cases from different federal courts are consolidated for
pretrial proceedings.
It is now my duty to close, and it is your treat to turn the page
and begin what will be compelling, pointed, convincing, and
thought-provoking reading. I know you will enjoy these pieces as
much as I did.
21. 70 LA. L. REv. 529(2010).
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